Nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping and generalised Nash equilibrium by Martyr, Randall & Moriarty, John
Nonzero-sum optimal stopping games and
generalised Nash equilibrium
Randall Martyr∗†1 and John Moriarty‡1
1School of Mathematical Sciences, Queen Mary University of London, Mile End Road,
London E1 4NS, United Kingdom.
September 27, 2018
Abstract
In the nonzero-sum setting, we establish a connection between Nash equilibria in games
of optimal stopping (Dynkin games) and generalised Nash equilibrium problems (GNEP). In
the Dynkin game this reveals novel equilibria of threshold type and of more complex types,
and leads to novel uniqueness and stability results.
1 Introduction
In this paper we establish a connection between Nash equilibria in two different types of game.
The first type is the two-player, nonzero-sum Dynkin game of optimal stopping (for general
background on optimal stopping problems the reader is referred to [26]). Player i ∈ {1, 2}
chooses a stopping time τi for a strong Markov process X = (Xt)t≥0 defined on the interval
(x`, xr). Reward functions fi, gi, hi are given and the reward or payoff to player i is
Ji(τ1, τ2) := fi(Xτi)1{τi<τ−i} + gi(Xτ−i)1{τ−i<τi} + hi(Xτi)1{τi=τ−i}, (1.1)
where for each player i ∈ {1, 2} the subscript −i denotes the other player. In this context
equilibrium strategies (τ1, τ2) of the form
τ1 = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≤ `} and τ2 = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ r}, (1.2)
for constants `, r ∈ (x`, xr) with ` < r, are referred to as threshold-type equilibria. A recent
example is in [11], in which the thresholds `, r are drawn from the disjoint strategy spaces S1
and S2 respectively where
S1 := [x`, a], S2 := [b, xr], (1.3)
for some constants a, b with x` < a < b < xr.
The second type of game is a deterministic generalised game [15] (or abstract economy [1])
with n ≥ 2 players, where n will depend on the structure of the equilibrium studied in the
Dynkin game. Since the examination of all cases n ≥ 2 is reserved for future work, however, we
focus on n = 2 and simply provide an example with n = 3.
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The connection yields novel equilibria in the Dynkin game. This novelty is threefold. Firstly
the reward functions are not required to be differentiable. Secondly we obtain novel equilibria
of threshold type, since both cases a < b and a ≥ b are permitted. Thirdly, while threshold-type
equilibria correspond to the case n = 2, the cases n > 2 yield equilibria with more complex
structures. To the best of our knowledge, these complex equilibrium structures in the Dynkin
game have not been previously studied.
In the threshold-type case, we obtain the uniqueness of the equilibria among Markovian
strategies, and results about their local and global stability.
1.1 Background
The structure of Nash equilibria in nonzero-sum Dynkin games has recently been investigated
in [3] and [11], where sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of threshold-type
equilibria are obtained. A key difference between the case n = 2 of the present paper and the
latter work is that there, the functions fi in (1.1) are twice differentiable and have unique points
of inflexion a and b respectively with a < b, conditions which may all be relaxed in the present
approach. Appendix A contains remarks on the inclusion of time discounting, and the use of
other Markov processes X, in our setup.
Our results on stability relate to an iterative approximation scheme for Nash equilibria, which
has been previously studied outside the Markovian framework in [17] and, in the Markovian
framework, in [6], [9], [19] and [25]. In [19] it is assumed that fi = gi and in [6], [9] and [25]
a condition related to superharmonicity is imposed for the gi. The latter conditions ensure
monotone convergence over the iteration, whereas the approach via stability in Section 5 does
not rely on monotonicity.
The special case of zero-sum Dynkin games, in which fi = −g−i and hi = −h−i, has received
particular attention in the literature. Thorough analyses of the zero-sum game for a large class
of driving Markov processes can be found in [14] and [27] and in that context Assumption 1,
which relates the game to a war of attrition [16, Section 4.5.2], is sufficient for the existence of a
Nash equilibrium among pure strategies. We adopt the same setting, as is also common in the
nonzero-sum context (see for example [6, 9, 25]).
Assumption 1. For i = 1, 2 the functions fi, gi and hi are bounded and continuous on [x`, xr],
and satisfy fi ≤ hi ≤ gi.
In Remark 4.6 we discuss how Assumption 1 can be weakened without affecting the main
results.
1.2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall necessary background on subprocesses, superharmonic and quasi-concave
functions, which should be familiar.
1.2.1 Subprocesses of a Brownian motion
Let W = (Wt)t≥0 be a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on a filtered proba-
bility space (Ω,F ,F = (Ft)t≥0, Pˆ), where F is the universally completed filtration [7, p. 27]. We
will write the probability measure as Pˆx in the case Pˆ({W0 = x}) = 1, and denote the expec-
tation operator with respect to Pˆx by Eˆx. From W we derive subprocesses in the sense of [7,
Chapter III]. More precisely, for each subset E of [0, 1] we define a subprocess XE = X = (Xt)t≥0
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such that X and its (almost surely finite) lifetime ζ satisfy,
ζ = inf{t ≥ 0: Wt /∈ E}, (1.4)
Xt =
{
Wt, 0 ≤ t < ζ,
∆, t ≥ ζ. (1.5)
Here ∆ is a cemetery state and the state space of X is E equipped with its Borel sigma-algebra
B(E) and augmented by ∆. We set φ(∆) = 0 for every measurable function φ on E∆ := E ∪∆,
showing in Section 3.1 below that this choice involves no loss of generality. For x ∈ E let
Px and Ex denote the probability measure and expectation operator corresponding to X when
Px({X0 = x}) = 1. For every measurable function φ vanishing outside E and every t ≥ 0 we
have [7, p. 105]:
Ex[φ(Xt)] = Eˆ
x[φ(Wt)1{t<ζ}]. (1.6)
For each measurable set A we write the associated first entrance time of X as
DA := inf{t ≥ 0: Xt ∈ A} = inf{t > 0: Xt ∈ A} a.s., (1.7)
where we take inf ∅ = ζ (the second equality follows since every point is regular for Brownian
motion, see for example [24, Remark 8.2]).
1.2.2 Superharmonic functions
We will use the fact that value functions of various optimal stopping problems for these subpro-
cesses are superharmonic (see e.g. [10] and Proposition 3.1). Let E ⊆ [0, 1], A ∈ B(E∆), and
write T for the set of all F-stopping times with values in R+ ∪ {∞}.
Definition 1. A measurable function φ : E∆ → R is said to be superharmonic (resp. harmonic)
on A if for every x ∈ E and τ ∈ T :
φ(x) ≥ (resp. =) Ex[φ(Xτ∧DAc )].
A measurable function φ : E∆ → R is said to be subharmonic on A if −φ is superharmonic on
A, and harmonic on A if it is both superharmonic and subharmonic on A. If A = E then the
term superharmonic, subharmonic, or harmonic is used as appropriate.
Using the strong Markov property, one can show that (see [27, p. 561] for details): if φ is
superharmonic then
φ(Xν) ≥ Ex[φ(Xρ)|Fν ], a.s. ∀ ρ, ν ∈ T such that ν ≤ ρ. (1.8)
In other words, φ is a superharmonic function if and only if (φ(Xt))t≥0 is a strong supermartingale
with respect to F. Here the qualifier ‘strong’ refers to the extension of the supermartingale
property to stopping times. In our setup the superharmonic functions on E are also equivalent
to the strongly supermedian functions on E (see for example [9], [20] and [23]), as follows. Taking
A = E and τ = ζ in Definition 1, the convention φ(∆) = 0 implies that the superharmonic
functions φ on E are non-negative and are therefore strongly supermedian. Moreover, since X
is a subprocess of Brownian motion, superharmonic (respectively subharmonic and harmonic)
functions are concave (resp. convex, linear) on convex subsets of E (see [10, p. 179]).
We will make repeated use of the following transformation.
Definition 2. Given A ∈ B(E∆) and a bounded measurable function φ : E∆ → R, and recalling
the first entrance time defined in (1.7), define φA : E∆ → R by
φA(x) := E
x [φ(XDA)] . (1.9)
It is not difficult to show (using the strong Markov property) that for any measurable function
φ, the function φA is harmonic on A
c, and is superharmonic if φ is superharmonic. Moreover, it
is continuous whenever φ is continuous and A is closed in E [30].
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1.2.3 Quasi-concavity
For use in the existence results below, we recall the definition and some properties of quasi-
concave functions (see e.g. [8, Chapter 3.4]). The extended real line will be denoted by R¯ =
[−∞,+∞].
Definition 3. Let D ⊆ R be convex. A function F : D → R¯ is said to be quasi-concave if for
every α ∈ R the superlevel sets L+α defined by
L+α = {x ∈ D : F (x) ≥ α}
are convex. If the same statement holds but with the sets {x ∈ D : F (x) > α} then F is said to
be strictly quasi-concave. A function F is said to be (strictly) quasi-convex on a convex domain
D if and only if −F is (strictly) quasi-concave.
All concave functions are quasi-concave. Moreover a function F : D → R¯ is quasi-concave if
and only if D is convex and for any x1, x2 ∈ D and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 we have
F (θx1 + (1− θ)x2) ≥ min(F (x1), F (x2)). (1.10)
If (1.10) holds with strict inequality then F is strictly quasi-concave.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the two game settings are
presented and connected. Useful alternative expressions for the expected payoffs in the Dynkin
game, as optimal stopping problems for subprocesses, are developed in Section 3, and our main
existence and uniqueness results follow in Sections 4 and 5. Finally, in Section 6 we present an
extension for a more complex equilibrium structure.
2 Two games
2.1 Generalised Nash equilibrium
In the n-player generalised game each player’s set of available strategies, or feasible strategy
space, depends on the strategies chosen by the other n− 1 players. The case n = 2 is as follows.
Player i ∈ {1, 2} has a strategy space Si and a set-valued map Ki : S−i ⇒ Si determining their
feasible strategy space. Denoting a generic strategy for player i by si, a strategy pair (s1, s2) is
then feasible if si ∈ Ki(s−i) for i = 1, 2. Setting S1 = [0, a] and S2 = [b, 1], the pair of mappings
K1 : [b, 1]⇒ [0, a] and K2 : [0, a]⇒ [b, 1] will be given by
K1(y) = [0, y ∧ a],
K2(x) = [x ∨ b, 1],
(2.1)
where a and b are given constants lying in the interval (0, 1). That is, the feasible strategy pairs
are given by the convex, compact set
C = {(x, y) ∈ [0, a]× [b, 1] : x ≤ y}. (2.2)
This choice of C will be appropriate for equilibria of the threshold form (1.2) in the Dynkin
game. (The set C will be modified in Section 6 below, where an example of a more complex
equilibrium is studied). Writing Ui : C → R¯ for the utility function of player i, the generalised
Nash equilibrium problem is then given by:
Definition 4 (GNEP, n = 2). Find s∗ = (s∗1, s∗2) ∈ C which is a Nash equilibrium, that is:
U1(s
∗) = sup
(s1,s∗2)∈C
U1(s1, s
∗
2),
U2(s
∗) = sup
(s∗1,s2)∈C
U2(s
∗
1, s2).
(2.3)
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In the proofs below it will be convenient to write S := S1×S2. We will also make use of the
following definition:
Definition 5. Let s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ Rn and w ∈ R. Then for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we will
write (w, s−i) for the vector s modified by replacing its ith entry with w.
2.2 Optimal stopping
We also consider a Dynkin game in which two players observe the Brownian motion subprocess
X of Section 1.2.1. Each player can stop the game and receive a reward (which may be positive
or negative) depending on the process value and on who stopped the game first. More precisely
we consider only pure strategies: that is, each player i ∈ {1, 2} chooses a stopping time τi lying
in T as their strategy. Let fi, gi and hi be real-valued reward functions on E which respectively
determine the reward to player i from stopping first, second, or at the same time as the other
player. For convenience we will refer to the fi as the leader reward functions and to the gi as
the follower reward functions. Given a pair of strategies (τ1, τ2) and recalling the payoff defined
in (1.1), we denote the expected payoff to player i by
Mxi (τ1, τ2) = E
x [Ji(τ1, τ2)] . (2.4)
The problem of finding a Nash equilibrium for this Dynkin game is then:
Definition 6 (DP). Find a pair (τ∗1 , τ∗2 ) ∈ T × T such that for every x ∈ E we have:
Mx1 (τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ) = sup
τ1∈T
Mx1 (τ1, τ
∗
2 )
Mx2 (τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ) = sup
τ2∈T
Mx2 (τ
∗
1 , τ2).
(2.5)
If τ∗1 = DS1 and τ∗2 = DS2 with S1, S2 ∈ B(E∆), then the Nash equilibrium (DS1 , DS2) is said
to be Markovian.
2.3 Linking the games
We now present the link between the games in the case n = 2 and E = (0, 1), which is the setting
used in the rest of the paper (with the exception of Section 6, where n = 3). The idea is that
threshold-type solutions to the DP can be characterised by the slopes U1(x, y) and U2(x, y) of
certain secant lines. This gives nothing else than a deterministic game, which may be studied in
the above generalised setting in order to discover additional novel equilibria. We will close this
section by illustrating that this link between the DP and GNEP does not preserve the zero-sum
property.
2.3.1 Construction of utility functions for the GNEP
For (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 we define
U1(x, y) =
{
f1(x)−g1,[y,1](x)
y−x , x < y,
−∞, otherwise,
U2(x, y) =
{
f2(y)−g2,[0,x](y)
y−x , x < y,
−∞, otherwise,
(2.6)
where for A ∈ B(E∆), the function gi,A is obtained by taking φ = gi in Definition 2. To ensure
that these utility functions are continuous and bounded above on C we strengthen Assumption
1 to:
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Assumption 1’ If b ≤ a then gi > fi on [b, a] for i = 1, 2.
We now record comments on this choice of utility functions in the GNEP:
(i) The rationale for the form (2.6) of U1 and U2 is as follows. Lemma 3.2 below will confirm
that in equilibrium, player 1’s strategy is characterised by an optimal stopping problem with
obstacle f1− g1,[r,1], whose geometry determines the solution (in the sense of [10], for example).
In particular we show in Theorem 4.5 that, for threshold strategies, the function U1 characterises
the solution. Similar comments of course apply to player 2.
(ii) The GNEP characterisation does not assume smoothness but, if the reward functions are
differentiable, then the double smooth fit condition (that is, the differentiability of the players’
equilibrium payoffs across the thresholds ` and r respectively) follows as a corollary.
(iii) Later, in Section 6, we show how additional functions Ui may be added to characterise
more complex equilibria than the threshold type, leading to GNEPs with more than two players.
2.3.2 Remark on the zero-sum property
It is interesting to note that the zero-sum property in the DP does not imply the same for the
GNEP and vice versa. Suppose that the GNEP (2.6) has zero sum: that is,
2∑
i=1
Ui(x, y) = 0, ∀ (x, y) ∈ S. (2.7)
By Definition 2 the functions g1,[y,1] and g2,[0,x] are given by:
g1,[y,1](x) =
{
g1(y) · xy , ∀x ∈ [0, y)
g1(x), ∀x ∈ [y, 1],
(2.8)
g2,[0,x](y) =
{
g2(y), ∀y ∈ [0, x]
g2(x) · 1−y1−x , ∀y ∈ (x, 1],
(2.9)
and we recall that f1(0) = g2(0) = g1(1) = f2(1) = 0. Then considering separately the case
x = 0, y ∈ [b, 1] in (2.7) and the case y = 1, x ∈ [0, a], we conclude that f1(x) = f2(y) =
0, ∀ (x, y) ∈ S. Then in the DP, any nonzero choice of the reward functions gi satisfying
Assumption 1 results in a game with fi 6= −g−i and hence is nonzero sum.
On the other hand, suppose that a < b and consider the zero-sum DP with reward functions
f1(x) =
{
x(a− x), x ∈ [0, a]
(1− x)(a− x), x ∈ (a, 1],
g1(x) =
{
x(b− x), x ∈ [0, b)
(1− x)(b− x), x ∈ [b, 1],
f2 = −g1, g2 = −f1, h1 = −h2.
Then for (x, y) ∈ S the sum of the payoffs in the GNEP is
2∑
i=1
Ui(x, y) = x
(
a− x
y − x
)(
1 +
1− y
1− x
)
−
(
(1− y)(b− y)
y − x
)(
y + x
y
)
,
which is strictly positive for (x, y) ∈ {0, a} × (b, 1), and so the GNEP is not zero sum.
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3 Optimal stopping of a subprocess
In this section we provide three equivalent expressions for expected payoffs in the Dynkin game,
as optimal stopping problems for subprocesses. These will be used repeatedly to establish the
existence and uniqueness results of Sections 4 and 5.
3.1 Preliminaries
We begin by confirming that without loss of generality all reward functions may be set equal to
zero on ∆. Suppose instead that the reward is to be nonzero on ∆. This could be accommodated
by taking the following modified form for the expected payoffs:
MxE(τ, σ) = Eˆ
x
[{
f(Wτ )1{τ<σ} + g(Wσ)1{τ>σ} + h(Wσ)1{τ=σ}
}
1{(τ∧σ)<DEc}
]
+ Eˆx
[
H(WDEc )1{(τ∧σ)≥DEc}
]
,
(3.1)
where τ, σ denote the players’ stopping times and H specifies the reward received at the
boundaries of E. This is for example the approach taken in [3], where it is assumed that
f(x) = g(x) = H(x), x ∈ Ec. Note also that by construction only the values of H on Ec are
relevant. Now taking φ = H and A = Ec in Definition 2 and using the strong Markov property
we can show that,
MxE(τ, σ)−HEc(x) = Eˆx
[{
[f −HEc ](Wτ )1{τ<σ} + [g −HEc ](Wσ)1{τ>σ}
+ [h−HEc ](Wσ)1{τ=σ}
}
1{(τ∧σ)<DEc}
]
= Ex
[{
[f −HEc ](Xτ )1{τ<σ} + [g −HEc ](Xσ)1{τ>σ}
+ [h−HEc ](Xσ)1{τ=σ}
}
1{(τ∧σ)<DEc}
]
, (3.2)
where the second equality comes from (1.6) above. The right-hand side of (3.2) is equal to the
expected payoff (3.1) when the reward functions f , g, h and H are taken to be f˜ = f −HEc ,
g˜ = g−HEc , h˜ = h−HEc and H˜ ≡ 0 respectively. It may therefore be assumed without loss of
generality in the proofs below that the reward functions are zero on ∆ (and indeed on Ec).
We will be interested in optimally stopping the subprocess XA
c
. For this, define the set of
stopping times T0,DA := {τ ∈ T : 0 ≤ τ ≤ DA}. The proof of the following useful result can be
found in, for example, [4] and [14]:
Proposition 3.1. For A ∈ B(E∆) and functions f , g and h satisfying Assumption 1, the map
x 7→ Vˇ (x) := sup
τ∈T
Ex
[
f(Xτ )1{τ<DA} + g(XDA)1{DA<τ} + h(XDA)1{τ=DA}
]
,
is measurable and satisfies:
∀ρ ∈ T0,DA : Ex[Vˇ (Xρ)] ≤ Vˇ (x) ∀x ∈ E. (3.3)
In other words, x 7→ Vˇ (x) is superharmonic on Ac.
3.2 Single player problem
Suppose that in the Dynkin game, the strategy of player −i is specified by a set A ∈ B(E∆)
on which that player stops. The next lemma expresses the resulting optimisation problem for
player i in terms of optimal stopping problems of different kinds for the subprocess XA
c
.
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Lemma 3.2. For x ∈ E consider the problems
V A(x) := sup
τ∈T
Mx(τ,DA), (3.4)
V¯ A(x) := sup
τ∈T
M¯x(τ,DA), (3.5)
V˜ A(x) := sup
τ∈T
M˜x(τ,DA), (3.6)
where for τ ∈ T we have
Mx(τ,DA) := E
x
[
f(Xτ )1{τ<DA} + g(XDA)1{DA<τ} + h(XDA)1{τ=DA}
]
, (3.7)
M¯x(τ,DA) := E
x
[
f(Xτ )1{τ<DA} + g(XDA)1{τ≥DA}
]
, (3.8)
M˜x(τ,DA) := E
x
[{
f − gA
}
(Xτ )1{τ<DA}
]
, (3.9)
and f , g and h are functions satisfying Assumption 1. Then, recalling Definition 2, we have
V A(x) = V¯ A(x) = gA(x) + V˜
A(x). (3.10)
Proof. Let τ ∈ T , x ∈ E be arbitrary. We have M¯x(τ,DA) ≥Mx(τ,DA) and therefore V¯ A(x) ≥
V A(x). To show the reverse inequality, first recall that x 7→ V A(x) is measurable. By assumption
we have V A ≥ f on E, so that V A(Xτ )1{τ<DA} ≥ f(Xτ )1{τ<DA} a.s., while from the strong
Markov property we have V A(XDA) = g(XDA) a.s.. It follows from (3.8) and superharmonicity
that
M¯x(τ,DA) ≤ Ex
[
V A(Xτ∧DA)
] ≤ V A(x),
and taking the supremum over τ we have V¯ A(x) = V A(x). Finally, recalling Definition 2 we
have
M¯(τ,DA)− gA(x) = Ex
[{
f − gA
}
(Xτ )1{τ<DA}
]
. (3.11)
Remark 3.3. It follows from (3.10) that
V A(x) = f(x) ⇐⇒ V˜ A(x) = f(x)− gA(x).
That is, defining the stopping region to be the subset of Ac on which the obstacle equals the
value function, the optimal stopping problems V A(x) and V˜ A(x) have identical stopping regions.
An easy consequence is that if x ∈ Ac lies in either stopping region then f(x) ≥ gA(x), and that
if f ≤ gA on Ac then τ = DA is optimal in (3.6).
4 Existence of equilibria
In this section we exploit the link between the games to show, firstly, that the existence of a
solution to the GNEP with utility functions given by (2.6) implies the existence of a threshold-
type solution to the DP (Theorems 4.4 and 4.5). These results are then applied to show the
existence of novel Nash equilibria in the DP. More precisely we will show that the following
condition on the geometry of the reward functions is sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium:
Condition G1. There exist points a ∈ (0, 1) and b ∈ (0, 1) such that
(i) f1 is concave on [0, a] and is convex on [a, 1]
(ii) f2 is convex on [0, b] and is concave on [b, 1]
(iii) If b ≤ a, then fi < gi on [b, a] for i = 1, 2.
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The case a > b is novel when compared with the existing literature. It is interesting to note
that in the case a ≤ b, which is analysed in [3] and [11], the generalised problem (2.3) reduces
to a classical game (that is, where each player’s strategy space does not depend on the other
player’s chosen strategy). This is because the dependency between the players’ strategies (which
is specified by the choice of C) allows some additional control on the equilibria, which is required
when a > b. The case when at least one of the functions fi is not differentiable is also novel.
4.1 Preliminaries
A solution to the GNEP is known to exist under the following condition (see for example [1]
and [15]):
Condition U.
(i) For each fixed s2 ∈ S2, the mapping s1 7→ U1(s1, s2) is quasi-concave on K1(s2). For
each fixed s1 ∈ S1, the mapping s2 7→ U2(s1, s2) is quasi-concave on K2(s1).
(ii) The utility functions s 7→ Ui(s) for i = 1, 2 are continuous in s = (s1, s2).
For convenience we record the necessary argument here:
Lemma 4.1. Suppose Assumption 1’ and Condition U hold. Then there exists a solution(
s∗1, s∗2
) ∈ C to the GNEP (2.3) satisfying s∗1 < s∗2.
Proof. For i = 1, 2 the correspondence Ki is compact and convex valued. Furthermore, using the
notion of continuity for set-valued maps in [28], we can confirm that K1 and K2 are continuous.
Under the present hypotheses, Ui is continuous on S and has the quasi-concavity property
specified in Condition U. Therefore by Lemma 2.5 in [1], there exists a solution s∗ to (2.3).
From the construction (2.6), this solution must satisfy s∗1 < s∗2.
Remark 4.2. For possible extensions of Lemma 4.1 see also [15, 18] and references therein.
Before presenting the main result of this section we need the following fact:
Lemma 4.3. Suppose D ⊆ R is convex, f : D → R¯ is (strictly) concave, and ϕ : D → (0,∞) is
linear. Then the function fϕ : D → R¯ is (strictly) quasi-concave.
Proof. In the case of concavity, for each α ∈ R define a function Fα : D → R¯ by Fα(x) =
f(x) − αϕ(x). This function is concave on D, and therefore quasi-concave, which means the
superlevel set {x ∈ D : Fα(x) ≥ 0} is convex for every α ∈ R. The function fϕ is quasi-concave
on D since for every α ∈ R,{
x ∈ D :
(
f
ϕ
)
(x) ≥ α
}
= {x ∈ D : f(x) ≥ αϕ(x)} = {x ∈ D : Fα(x) ≥ 0} .
The proof for strictly concave f follows in the same way.
4.2 Existence results
The GNEP is used in this section to establish the existence of equilibria in the DP. This both
allows a > b in Condition G1 and avoids the need for smoothness assumptions.
Theorem 4.4. Under Condition G1, there exists a pair (`∗, r∗) ∈ [0, a] × [b, 1] such that
(D[0,`∗], D[r∗,1]) is a solution to the DP.
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Proof. We begin by noting that for each r ∈ [0, 1] and ` ∈ [0, 1],
sup
x∈[0,r)
U1(x, r) ≤ sup
x∈[0,a]
U1(x, r), (4.1)
sup
x∈(`,1]
U2(`, x) ≤ sup
x∈[b,1]
U2(`, x). (4.2)
For r ∈ (a, 1], eq. (4.1) follows from the convexity of f1 − g1,[r,1] on [a, r] and the fact that
f1(r) ≤ g1(r) = g1,[r,1](r):
f1(x)− g1,[r,1](x)
r − x ≤
f1(a)− g1,[r,1](a)
r − a +
(
f1(r)− g1,[r,1](r)
r − a
)(
x− a
r − x
)
≤ f1(a)− g1,[r,1](a)
r − a , ∀x ∈ (a, r).
Similar reasoning establishes (4.2).
Using Condition G1 and Lemma 4.3, we can verify the hypotheses of Lemma 4.1 and assert
the existence of a pair
(
`, r
) ∈ [0, a]× [b, 1] with ` < r such that{
U1(x, r) ≤ U1(`, r), ∀x ∈ [0, r ∧ a],
U2(`, y) ≤ U2(`, r), ∀y ∈ [` ∨ b, 1].
(4.3)
The pair (`, r) that satisfies (4.3) therefore also satisfies
U1(x, r) ≤ U1(`, r), ∀x ∈ [0, r), (4.4)
U2(`, y) ≤ U2(`, r), ∀y ∈ (`, 1], (4.5)
and the result follows from the next theorem.
Theorem 4.5. For every r ∈ [b, 1], a point `r ∈ [0, a] with `r < r satisfies (4.1) if and only if
V
[r,1]
1 (x) := sup
τ1∈T
Mx1 (τ1, D[r,1]) = M
x
1 (D[0,`r], D[r,1]), ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. (4.6)
Similarly, for every ` ∈ [0, a], a point r` ∈ [b, 1] with ` < r` satisfies (4.2) if and only if
V
[0,`]
2 (x) := sup
τ2∈T
Mx2 (D[0,`], τ2) = M
x
2 (D[0,`], D[r`,1]), ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. (4.7)
Proof. We only show (4.4) ⇐⇒ (4.6), since (4.5) ⇐⇒ (4.7) follows by similar arguments. Let
r ∈ [b, 1] and `r ∈ [0, a] with `r < r be given. We will make repeated use of the function
ur(x) := M
x
1 (D[0,`r], D[r,1])− g1,[r,1](x) =

f1(x)− g1,[r,1](x), x ∈ [0, `r),(
f1(`r)− g1,[r,1](`r)
)
r−x
r−`r , x ∈ [`r, r),
0, x ∈ [r, 1],
(4.8)
where the middle line is a straightforward consequence of the identities in Appendix B and the
fact that, for x ∈ [0, r], we have
g1(r)
x− `r
r − `r − g1,[r,1](x) = g1(r)
(
x− `r
r − `r −
x
r
)
= g1(r)
(
r(x− `r)− x(r − `r)
r(r − `r)
)
= −g1(r)
(
`r
r
)(
r − x
r − `r
)
= −g1,[r,1](`r)
r − x
r − `r . (4.9)
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Sufficiency (⇐= ).
Suppose that (4.6) is satisfied. Substituting this in (4.9), dividing both sides of (4.8) by r−x
(when x < r), and using the definition (2.6) of U1, we obtain
V
[r,1]
1 (x)− g1,[r,1](x)
r − x =
{
U1(x, r), ∀x ≤ `r
U1(`r, r), ∀`r < x < r.
(4.10)
It is easy to see that V
[r,1]
1 (r) = g1(r) = g1,[r,1](r) and V
[r,1]
1 (x) ≥ f1(x) for all x ∈ [0, r].
Therefore when x ∈ (`r, r) we have
U1(`r, r) ≥ U1(x, r).
To treat the case x ∈ [0, `r], note from Lemma 3.2 that x 7→ V [r,1]1 (x) − g1,[r,1](x) is the value
function of an optimal stopping problem for a subprocess as in, for example, [10] and, as such,
is non-negative and superharmonic in (0, r). For 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1 define τx,y = D{x}∧D{y}. Using
superharmonicity and the fact that X is a positively recurrent diffusion, for every 0 ≤ x ≤ `r
we have,
V
[r,1]
1 (`r)− g1,[r,1](`r) ≥ E`r
[
V
[r,1]
1 (Xτx,r)− g1,[r,1](Xτx,r)
]
=
(
V
[r,1]
1 (x)− g1,[r,1](x)
)
E`r
[
1{D{x}<D{r}}
]
=
(
V
[r,1]
1 (x)− g1,[r,1](x)
) r − `r
r − x . (4.11)
Since for all 0 ≤ x ≤ `r we have V [r,1]1 (x) = f1(x), (4.11) gives
U1(x, r) ≤ U1(`r, r), ∀x ∈ [0, `r],
establishing (4.4) with ` = `r.
Necessity ( =⇒ ).
Suppose that the pair (`r, r) satisfies (4.4) with ` = `r. We will establish (4.6) by showing
that
ur(x) = V
[r,1]
1 (x)− g1,[r,1](x), ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. (4.12)
By construction (4.12) holds for x ∈ [r, 1], and so we restrict attention to the domain [0, r]. By
Lemma 3.2 it is sufficient to show that ur is the value function of the optimal stopping problem
on [0, r] with the obstacle ϑ := f1 − g1,[r,1]. Therefore using Proposition 3.2 in [10], it is enough
to show that ur is the smallest non-negative concave majorant of ϑ on [0, r]. The majorant
property on [`r, r) follows from (4.4), which gives
f1(x)− g1,[r,1](x) ≤
(
f1(`r)− g1,[r,1](`r)
)( r − x
r − `r
)
, ∀x ∈ [0, r], (4.13)
and the majorant property at x = r follows from recalling that f1(r) ≤ g1(r). For nonnegativity
we first recall that the reward functions are null at the boundaries, so taking x = 0 in (4.13)
gives 0 ≤ f1(`r)− g1,[r,1](`r) = ur(`r). Combining this with the fact that ur equals the obstacle
on [0, `r], and hence is concave there, establishes nonnegativity. For concavity we note that ur
is a straight line on [`r, r], so it remains only to consider any x1 ∈ [0, `r) and x2 ∈ (`r, r]. Then
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we have
x2 − `r
x2 − x1ur(x1) +
`r − x1
x2 − x1ur(x2) =
x2 − `r
x2 − x1 [f1(x1)− g1,[r,1](x1)]
+
`r − x1
x2 − x1
(
f1(`r)− g1,[r,1](`r)
)(r − x2
r − `r
)
≤ x2 − `r
x2 − x1
(
f1(`r)− g1,[r,1](`r)
)(r − x1
r − `r
)
+
`r − x1
x2 − x1
(
f1(`r)− g1,[r,1](`r)
)(r − x2
r − `r
)
= f1(`r)− g1,[r,1](`r) = ur(`r),
where the inequality follows from (4.4). Finally, since ur equals the obstacle on [0, `r] and is a
straight line on [`r, r], it is smaller than any other nonnegative concave majorant on [0, r].
Remark 4.6. Theorem 4.4 remains valid under Condition G1 and the following condition which
is weaker than Assumption 1: fi ≤ gi on S−i.
5 Stability and uniqueness results
In this section we exploit the above connection to obtain additional novel results for Nash
equilibria in the DP. We define a concept of stability and provide a sufficient condition under
which it holds locally (Corollary 5.2), showing in Theorem 5.4 that this condition always holds
in the particular case of zero-sum Dynkin games. By establishing global stability, Theorem 5.5
provides sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the threshold-type equilibrium of Theorem 4.4
among the Markovian strategies. Finally, Theorem 5.8 transfers another uniqueness result for
the GNEP to the DP.
5.1 Policy iteration
We will apply the Gauss-Seidel policy iteration or taˆtonnement process [5, 16] to the GNEP.
This iteration scheme has previously been used for Dynkin games in [9] and [19] and, outside
the Markovian framework, in [17]. Throughout Section 5, for convenience we will assume the
following Condition G1’, rather than G1:
Condition G1’. Condition G1 holds, with:
1) a < b,
2) strict convexity and strict concavity,
3) fi, gi ∈ C2[0, 1], and
4) For all (x, y) ∈ [0, a] × [b, 1] there exists (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ (0, a] × [b, 1) with f1(xˆ) > g1(y) · xˆy and
f2(yˆ) > g2(x) · 1−yˆ1−x .
We emphasise that these assumptions are for ease of exposition. Parts 1) and 3) imply that
the GNEP utility functions are finite and smooth on S, which is convenient for the transfer of
results from generalised games. Part 2) says that f1 is strictly concave on [0, a] and strictly
convex on [a, 1], and f2 is strictly convex on [0, b] and strictly concave on [b, 1]. This ensures
that iteration (i) below is well defined. Part 4) removes the need to consider the points 0 and 1
as candidate thresholds, which is convenient since the principle of smooth fit (used below) may
break down there. Recalling the equality (3.10), this is straightforward to see from (3.6), (3.9)
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and (2.8)–(2.9). Part 4) similarly ensures that threshold-type equilibria have their thresholds in
(0, 1) and not at either boundary 0 or 1.
Taking `(1) ∈ [0, a], we consider the following two iteration schemes:
(i) In the GNEP: taking r(1) = arg maxy∈[b,1] U2(`(1), y), for n ≥ 2 define
`(n) = arg max
x∈[0,a]
U1(x, r
(n−1)), r(n) = arg max
y∈[b,1]
U2(`
(n), y). (5.1)
(ii) In the DP: taking A1 = [0, `
(1)], for n ≥ 1 define
(i) V2n(x) = sup
τ
Ex
[
f2(Xτ )1{τ<DA2n−1} + g2(XDA2n−1 )1{τ≥DA2n−1}
]
,
(ii) A2n = {x ∈ [0, 1] \A2n−1 : V2n(x) = f2(x)},
(iii) V2n+1(x) = sup
τ
Ex
[
f1(Xτ )1{τ<DA2n} + g1(XDA2n )1{τ≥DA2n}
]
,
(iv) A2n+1 = {x ∈ [0, 1] \A2n : V2n+1(x) = f1(x)}.
(5.2)
We will call a solution s∗ = (`∗, r∗) to the GNEP (2.3) globally stable if for any `(1) ∈ [0, a] the
iteration (5.1) satisfies `(n) → `∗ and r(n) → r∗, and locally stable if this convergence holds only
for `(1) in a neighbourhood of `∗. Similarly we call a threshold-type solution s′ = (D[0,`′], D[r′,1])
to the DP (2.5) globally stable if for any `(1) ∈ [0, a] the iteration (5.2) satisfies
lim inf
n→∞ A2n−1 = lim supn→∞
A2n−1 = [0, `′],
lim inf
n→∞ A2n = lim supn→∞
A2n = [r
′, 1],
and locally stable if convergence holds only for `(1) in a neighbourhood of `′.
5.2 Local stability
We will appeal to the following local stability result for the GNEP:
Proposition 5.1 (Theorem 1.2.3, [21]). Suppose that Condition G1’ holds and that (`∗, r∗) ∈
(0, a)× (b, 1) is a solution to the GNEP. For w ∈ S1 set
y¯ = y¯(w) = arg max
y∈S2
U2(w, y),
x¯ = x¯(w) = arg max
x∈S1
U1(x, y¯(w)),
(5.3)
and
T (w, x¯, y¯) :=
∂xyU1(x¯, y¯)
∂xxU1(x¯, y¯)
∂xyU2(w, y¯)
∂yyU2(w, y¯)
.
If it is true that
ρ0 = |T (`∗, `∗, r∗)| < 1, (5.4)
then there exists δ > 0 such that ∀ `(1) ∈ [0, a] satisfying |`(1) − `∗| < δ, the sequence {`(n)}n≥1
in (5.1) converges to `∗. The convergence is exponential: for any ε > 0 there exists a positive
constant c(`(1); ε) such that
|`(n) − `∗| ≤ c(`(1); ε)(ρ0 + ε)n. (5.5)
Our next result translates this into a local stability result for the DP.
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Corollary 5.2. Suppose Condition G1’ holds and that (D[0,`∗], D[r∗,1]) is a solution to the DP
such that (`∗, r∗) ∈ (0, a) × (b, 1) and (5.4) holds. Then the equilibrium (D[0,`∗], D[r∗,1]) in the
DP is locally stable.
Proof. We have from Theorem 4.5 that (`∗, r∗) ∈ (0, a) × (b, 1) is a solution to the GNEP.
Applying Proposition 5.1, take `(1) ∈ [0, a] satisfying |`(1) − `∗| < δ and consider the iteration
given by (5.1). This yields sequences (`(n)) → `∗ and (r(n)) → r∗, taking values respectively
in (0, a) and (b, 1). Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 4.5 then show that the stopping time D[r(n),1] is
optimal in (5.2)-i). Similarly, the stopping time D[0,`(n)] is optimal in (5.2)-iii).
Next we establish that the stopping region A2 is given by [r
(1), 1]. From Remark 3.3, we may
study the optimal stopping problem (5.2)-i) in either of its equivalent forms (3.4) or (3.6) (taking
f = f2, g = g2 and A = A1 = [0, `
(1)]). Using (3.4), it is immediate from the strict convexity
of the obstacle f2 on [`
(1), b] and Dynkin’s formula that A2 ∩ [`(1), b] = ∅. On the other hand,
considering problem (3.6) it follows from the strict concavity of the obstacle f2 − g2,A1 on [b, 1]
and the smooth fit principle that the obstacle lies strictly below the value function on [b, r(1)),
establishing that A2 = [r
(1), 1]. Arguing similarly for A3 and then proceeding inductively we
obtain A2n+1 = [0, `
(n+1)] and A2n+2 = [r
(n+1), 1] for all n.
Remark 5.3. The fact that A1 is an interval plays no role in the above proof, which only uses
the inclusion A1 ⊆ [0, a].
Local stability in the zero-sum DP. The link to GNEPs also provides the following
result on local stability of equilibria in the zero-sum DP, that is, when fi = −g−i, i ∈ {1, 2}.
The result is novel to the best of our knowledge.
Theorem 5.4. Under Condition G1’ every threshold-type solution of the zero-sum DP is locally
stable.
Proof. Let a threshold-type solution (D[0,`∗], D[r∗,1]) be given for the DP. We have V
[r∗,1]
1 +
V
[0,`∗]
2 = 0. Using the principle of smooth fit we get,
−g′2(`∗) = f ′1(`∗) =
g1(r∗)− f1(`∗)
r∗ − `∗
=
[−f2(r∗) + g2(`∗)]
r∗ − `∗ = −f
′
2(r∗) = g
′
1(r∗).
Using the expressions for U1 and U2 in (2.6), the general expressions for the partial derivatives
of the utility functions in Appendix C, and the smooth fit principle at (w, y¯) and (x¯, y¯), one can
show that
T (w, x¯, y¯) =
(
f ′1(x¯)− g′1(y¯)
f ′′1 (x¯)(y¯ − x¯)
)(
g′2(w)− f ′2(y¯)
f ′′2 (y¯)(y¯ − w)
)
. (5.6)
In this zero-sum context we therefore have T (`∗, `∗, r∗) = 0, and the local stability of the
equilibrium point now follows from Proposition 5.1.
5.3 Global stability and uniqueness
There is a stronger version of the criterion (5.4) that guarantees the iteration scheme to converge
irrespective of player 1’s initial strategy `(1) ∈ [0, a]. Furthermore, the equilibrium strategy
(`∗, r∗) thus obtained is unique.
Theorem 5.5. Suppose that Condition G1’ holds and that the reward functions fi and gi,
i = 1, 2, satisfy
sup
w∈S1
∣∣∣∣(f ′1(x¯)− g′1(y¯)f ′′1 (x¯)(y¯ − x¯)
)(
g′2(w)− f ′2(y¯)
f ′′2 (y¯)(y¯ − w)
)∣∣∣∣ < 1, (5.7)
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where y¯ = y¯(w) and x¯ = x¯(w) are defined by (5.3). Then there exists (`∗, r∗) ∈ S such that
(D[0,`∗], D[r∗,1]) is a solution to the DP. This solution is stable, and is unique in the class of
Markovian strategies (DS1 , DS2) for closed stopping sets S1 ⊆ [0, a] and S2 ⊆ [b, 1].
Proof. Under Condition G1’ every solution (`∗, r∗) to the GNEP lies in (0, a)×(b, 1). A standard
contraction argument then shows that under (5.7), there exists a unique solution (`∗, r∗) to the
GNEP and, further, that it is globally stable (see for example Theorem 1 in [22] or Proposition 4.1
in [5]; see also Theorem 1.2.1 in [21]).
Thus from Theorem 4.5, (D[0,`∗], D[r∗,1]) is a solution to the DP. The fact that it is stable
follows from the corresponding property in the GNEP. Suppose that the DP has another solution
(D[0,`], D[r,1]) with ` < r. Again arguing as in Corollary 5.2, the reward function geometry gives
` ∈ [0, a] and r ∈ [b, 1]. Therefore (`, r) is a solution to the GNEP and we have ` = `∗ and r = r∗
by uniqueness.
Suppose that (DS1 , DS2) is an equilibrium with closed stopping sets S1 ⊆ [0, a] and S2 ⊆ [b, 1].
Recalling Remark 5.3, now consider applying the iteration (ii) above, modified by choosing
A1 = S1, to obtain A2 = [r, 1], say. Then by optimality S2 ⊆ A2. Finally it is not difficult to
see from a standard ‘small ball’ argument that the strict concavity of f2 on [b, 1] implies that
A2 \ S2 = ∅. We conclude similarly that A1 has the form [0, `], completing the proof.
Remark 5.6. The sets S1 and S2 in Theorem 5.5 are closed in order to avoid trivialities, since
every point is regular for standard Brownian motion. Note that the theorem establishes unique-
ness among the Markovian strategies, rather than uniqueness among the subset of threshold-type
strategies (cf. [11]).
5.4 Examples
We begin this section by constructing an example DP satisfying the global stability condition
(5.7). This example is then used to derive a second DP for which local stability, but not global
stability, holds. Finally, we discuss local stability of the zero-sum DP.
Global stability. Suppose that b−a > 12 and that Fi, Gi are functions satisfying Condition
G1’ and furthermore,
F1(x) = x(
a
2 − x), x ∈ [0, a2 ].
It follows from Condition G1’ that F1 is negative on [
a
2 , 1]. Therefore, for every w ∈ S1 the ‘best
response’ x¯(w) to y¯(w) takes values in [0, a2 ], where we have the inequality∣∣∣∣ F ′1(x)F ′′1 (x)
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣x− a4 ∣∣ ≤ 14 .
Since G′1 is bounded on [0, a] by Condition G1’, and recalling that y¯ ∈ [b, 1] by definition, for a
sufficiently large constant R1 > 0 we have:∣∣∣∣∣F ′1(x¯)−
1
R1
G′1(y¯)
F ′′1 (x¯)(y¯ − x¯)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 · 14 · 1b− a < 1.
Therefore if player 1’s reward functions in the DP are f1 = F1 and g1 =
1
R1
G1 (which clearly
satisfy Condition G1’), then the left hand parenthesis in (5.7) has absolute value less than 1.
Similarly if we take F2(x) = (x− b+12 )(1−x) for all x ∈ [ b+12 , 1] and let player 2’s reward functions
be f2 = F2 and g2 =
1
R2
G2 for a sufficiently large constant R2, the right hand parenthesis in
(5.7) has absolute value less than 1 and so the global stability condition (5.7) holds.
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Remark 5.7. Under Assumption 1 the reward functions in the DP must satisfy fi ≤ gi on [0, 1].
Given the choice of gi in the example above, fi ≤ gi implies that the rather strong condition
Gi ≥ RiFi on [0, 1] must hold. Although Remark 4.6 shows that Gi ≥ RiFi is only needed on
S−i, there are alternative choices for gi that satisfy Assumption 1 and lead to a conclusion similar
to that of the example above. More specifically, in the case i = 1, take any G1 ≥ max(0, F1)
which is in C2[0, 1] and define g1 to be a suitable restriction of G1 to [0,
a
2 ] such that g1 is in
C2[0, 1], and on [b, 1] g1 is nonnegative and g
′
1 is sufficiently small. For example, let x 7→ η(x)
be the standard mollifier,
η(x) =
{
C exp
(
1
x2−1
)
, |x| < 1
0, |x| ≥ 1
where C > 0 is chosen so that
∫
R η(x)dx = 1. For  > 0 define η(x) :=
1
η(
x
 ), H(x) =∫ x
−∞ η(y)dy and set g1(x; ) = H(
a
2 − x + )G1(x). For x ≤ a2 we have g1(x; ) = G1(x) ≥
F1(x) = f1(x). For x ≥ a2 + 2 we have g1(x; ) = 0 ≥ F1(x) = f1(x) and, for an appropriate
choice of , g′1(x) = 0 on [b, 1].
Local stability only. Global stability implies that the local stability condition (5.4) holds
at the unique Nash equilibrium (`∗, r∗) in the DP we have just constructed. Taking the same
reward functions in the DP, suppose now that player 1’s strategy is w0 ∈ S1 and that player
2’s best response is r∗. Then from the smooth fit condition for player 2, the point (w0, g2(w0))
must lie on the straight line tangent to f2 at (r∗, f2(r∗)). We may therefore conclude that if g2
is not linear on S1, then there exists a strategy w0 ∈ S1 \ {`∗} for player 1 to which player 2’s
best response is y0 ∈ S2 \{r∗}. It is also not difficult to see that y0 ∈ ( b+12 , 1), and hence smooth
fit holds at y0, provided that g2 is bounded above by the tangent to f2 at (1, f2(1)).
Next we remark that the function f2 may be arbitrarily ‘flattened’ in a small neighbourhood
of y0 without violating Condition G1’. That is, let N0 be an open neighbourhood of y0 whose
closure does not contain r∗ and let  ∈ (f ′′2 (y0), 0). Then f2 may be modified on N0 to produce
a new function f˜2 with
f˜2(y) = f2(y), y ∈ {y0} ∪N c0 ,
f˜ ′2(y0) = f
′
2(y0),
f˜ ′′2 (y0) = ,
and such that Condition G1’ holds for the reward functions f1, f˜2 and gi. By construction, the
smooth fit condition continues to hold at y0 when f2 is replaced by f˜2, so that y0 remains player
2’s best response to w0. In this way the right hand multiplicand in (5.7) may be made arbitrarily
large in absolute value when w = w0 (provided the numerator is non-zero, a mild condition).
We thus obtain a DP satisfying Condition G1’ which has local, but not global, stability.
5.5 Uniqueness of Nash equilibria
We close this section with a final result on uniqueness of equilibria in the DP by applying a well
known condition in [29] for uniqueness of a solution to the GNEP.
Theorem 5.8. Suppose that Condition G1’ holds,
f ′′1 (x) ≤ −2
f1(x) + f
′
1(x)(y − x)− g1(y)
(y − x)2 , ∀(x, y) ∈ (0, a)× [b, 1], (5.8)
f ′′2 (y) ≤ −2
f2(y)− f ′2(y)(y − x)− g2(x)
(y − x)2 , ∀(x, y) ∈ [0, a]× (b, 1), (5.9)
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and ∃ (r1, r2) ∈ [0,∞)× [0,∞) such that ∀(x, y) ∈ S,
4r1r2H1(x, y)H2(x, y)−
(
r1H3(x, y) + r2H4(x, y)
)2
> 0, (5.10)
where H1,. . . ,H4 are given by,
H1(x, y) = f
′′
1 (x)(y − x)2 + 2
[
f1(x) + f
′
1(x)(y − x)− g1(y)
]
H2(x, y) = f
′′
2 (y)(y − x)2 + 2
[
f2(y)− f ′2(y)(y − x)− g2(x)
]
H3(x, y) = 2
[
g1(y)− f1(x)
]− (f ′1(x) + g′1(y))(y − x)
H4(x, y) = 2
[
g2(x)− f2(y)
]
+ (g′2(x) + f
′
2(y))(y − x).
(5.11)
Then there exists a unique solution (`∗, r∗) ∈ S to the GNEP (2.3), and therefore (D[0,`∗], D[r∗,1])
is the unique solution to the DP in the class of Markovian strategies (DS1 , DS2) for closed
stopping sets S1 ⊆ [0, a] and S2 ⊆ [b, 1].
Proof. Conditions (5.8)–(5.9) ensure that each utility function si 7→ Ui(si, s−i), i ∈ {1, 2}, is
concave on Si for each s−i ∈ S−i. The condition (5.11) is sufficient for strict diagonal concavity
according to Theorem 6 of [29]. The uniqueness result for the GNEP is an application of Theorem
2 in [29], whereas uniqueness for the DP follows from the proof of Theorem 5.5.
Remark 5.9. For possible extensions of Theorem 5.8 to quasi-concave utility functions see, for
example, [2]. A comment on the relationship between the sufficient conditions for uniqueness of
Nash equilibria used in Theorems 5.5 and 5.8 can be found in Remark 3.3 of [22].
6 Complex strategies and multiplayer GNEPs
The study of appropriate generalised games with n > 2 players yields equilibria for the two-
player Dynkin problem of Definition 2.5 with more complex structures than the threshold type
which has been previously studied. The systematic study of all cases n > 2 is beyond the scope
of this paper and so in this section we provide an example with n = 3.
This example uses the following relaxation of Condition G1, under which the reward function
f1 has an additional convex portion:
Condition G2. There exist points a1 and a2 with 0 < a1 ≤ a2 < b < 1 such that:
(i) f1 is convex on [0, a1], concave on [a1, a2] and convex on [a2, 1],
(ii) f2 is convex on [0, b] and concave on [b, 1].
Define sets Sˆ1 = Sˆ2 = [a1, a2], Sˆ3 = [b, 1] and Sˆ =
∏3
i=1 Sˆi. Let the utility functions
Uˆi : [0, 1]
3 → R¯, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} be defined by
Uˆ1(x, y, z) =
f1(x)− g1,[z,1](x)
x
,
Uˆ2(x, y, z) =
f1(y)− g1,[z,1](y)
z − y ,
Uˆ3(x, y, z) =
f2(z)− g2,[0,y](z)
z − y ,
(6.1)
(taking Uˆ2(x, y, z) = Uˆ3(x, y, z) = −∞ if y ≥ z). Define the players’ feasible strategy spaces by
the set-valued maps Kˆi : Sˆ−i ⇒ Sˆi, where
Kˆ1(y, z) = [a1, y ∧ a2], Kˆ2(x, z) = [x ∨ a1, a2], Kˆ3(x, y) = [b, 1], (6.2)
so that the feasible strategy triples belong to the convex, compact set Cˆ defined by
Cˆ = {(x, y, z) ∈ [a1, a2]× [a1, a2]× [b, 1] : x ≤ y}. (6.3)
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Theorem 6.1. Suppose that the DP satisfies Condition G2. Then:
(a) there exists s∗ = (`1, `2, r) ∈ Cˆ with
Uˆi(s
∗) = sup
(si,s∗−i)∈Cˆ
Uˆi(si, s
∗
−i), i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (6.4)
(b) a solution s∗ = (`1, `2, r) ∈ Cˆ to (6.4) satisfies Uˆ2(s∗) ≥ 0 if and only if (D[`1,`2], D[r,1]) is
a Nash equilibrium for the DP.
Proof. Part (a) follows as in the proof of Lemma 4.1. For part (b), we claim that the pair (`1, `2)
solves the following problem:
Problem: Find two points `1, `2 satisfying
i) a1 ≤ `1 ≤ `2 ≤ a2,
ii) Uˆ1(x, `
2, r) ≤ Uˆ1(`1, `2, r), ∀x ∈ (0, r),
iii) Uˆ2(`
1, y, r) ≤ Uˆ2(`1, `2, r), ∀y ∈ [0, r).
(P)
To establish part iii) note that the function y 7→ f1(y) − g1,[r,1](y) is zero at y = 0, convex
for y ∈ [0, a1], concave for y ∈ [a1, a2], convex for y ∈ [a2, r], nonnegative at y = `2 and negative
at y = r. It is then a straightforward exercise in convex analysis, similar to that in the proof
of Theorem 4.4, to show that the maximum of the function y 7→ Uˆ2(`1, y, r) on [0, r) must be
attained at a point in [a1, a2]. Taking i = 2 in (6.4) then establishes the claim. Part ii) follows
similarly.
The necessity and sufficiency claim for the Nash equilibrium in stopping strategies then
follows by applying Propositions D.1 and D.2 in the Appendix.
A Other Markov processes and discounting
Let X = (Xt)t≥0 be a continuous strong Markov process defined on an interval E = (`, r).
Suppose that the rewards in the DP are discounted by a factor λ ≥ 0, so that (1.1) becomes
Ji(τ1, τ2) := e−λ(τi∧τ−i){fi(Xτi)1{τi<τ−i} + gi(Xτ−i)1{τ−i<τi} + hi(Xτi)1{τi=τ−i}},
i ∈ {1, 2}. (1.1’)
Lemma 3.2 has a straightforward extension to the case λ > 0. Extending the concept of su-
perharmonic functions in Definition 1, we say that a measurable function φ : E∆ → R is λ-
superharmonic on a set A ∈ B(E∆) if for every x ∈ E and τ ∈ T ,
φ(x) ≥ Ex[e−λ(τ∧DAc )φ(Xτ∧DAc )].
The function φA introduced in Definition 2 is given more generally by,
φA(x) := E
x
[
e−λDAφ(XDA)
]
.
It was noted in Section 1.2.2 that φA is continuous when λ = 0, g is continuous and A is closed,
since X = XE is a subprocess of a Brownian motion. This same property, which is important
for ensuring that the obstacle in problem (3.6) is continuous, also holds for λ ≥ 0 when X
is a more general diffusion with strictly positive diffusion coefficient [30]. Furthermore, when
X is a subprocess of a regular diffusion Z = (Zt)t≥0, the results in Sections 4–5 hold under
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an appropriate modification of Condition G1. We now briefly discuss this extension when Z
satisfies the stochastic differential equation,
dZt = µ(Zt)dt+ σ(Zt)dWt, (A.1)
where W = (Wt)t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion, µ : E → R and σ : E → (0,∞) are mea-
surable functions, µ bounded and σ continuous, satisfying the following condition: for every
x ∈ E, ∫ x+ε
x−ε
1 + |µ(y)|
σ2(y)
dy <∞ for some ε > 0.
Let G = 12σ2(·) d
2
dx + µ(·) ddx denote the infinitesimal generator corresponding to Z.
A.1 Undiscounted rewards
For the case λ = 0, we first recall from [10] that there is a continuous increasing function S
on E, the scale function, which satisfies GS(·) ≡ 0. Let ˜` = S(`), r˜ = S(r) and X˜ = (X˜t)t≥0
be a Brownian motion on E˜ = (˜`, r˜). Then, it follows from Proposition 3.3 of [10] that the
DP corresponding to the process X and rewards fi, gi and hi on E can be studied by an
equivalent DP corresponding to X˜ with reward functions f˜i(·) = fi(S−1(·)), g˜i(·) = gi(S−1(·)),
h˜i(·) = hi(S−1(·)) on E˜.
A.2 Discounted rewards
For the case λ > 0, we first let ψλ and φλ denote the fundamental solutions to the diffusion
generator equation Gw = λw, where ψλ is strictly increasing and φλ is strictly decreasing [10,
p. 177]. Let F (·) = ψλ(·)
φλ(·) ,
˜` = F (`), r˜ = F (r) and X˜ = (X˜t)t≥0 be a Brownian motion
on E˜ = (˜`, r˜). Then, it follows from Proposition 4.3 of [10] that the DP corresponding to
the process X and rewards fi, gi and hi on E discounted by λ > 0 can be studied by an
equivalent DP corresponding to X˜ with reward functions f˜i(·) = fiφλ (F−1(·)), g˜i(·) = giφλ (F−1(·)),
h˜i(·) = hiφλ (F−1(·)) on E˜ without discounting.
B Expected payoffs for threshold strategies
If players 1 and 2 use the strategies D[0,`] and D[r,1] respectively, where 0 ≤ ` < r ≤ 1, then the
expected payoff Mx1 (D[0,`], D[r,1]) for player 1 (cf. (2.4)) satisfies,
Mx1 (D[0,`], D[r,1]) = E
x
[
f1(XD[0,`])1{D[0,`]<D[r,1]} + g1(XD[r,1])1{D[r,1]<D[0,`]}
]
+ Ex
[
h1(XD[0,`])1{D[0,`]=D[r,1]}
]
=

f1(x), ∀x ∈ [0, `]
f1(`) · Px({D[0,`] < D[r,1]}) + g1(r) · Px({D[0,`] > D[r,1]}), ∀x ∈ (`, r)
g1(x), ∀x ∈ [r, 1]
=

f1(x), ∀x ∈ [0, `]
f1(`) · r−xr−` + g1(r) · x−`r−` , ∀x ∈ (`, r)
g1(x), ∀x ∈ [r, 1]
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Analogously, the expected payoff Mx2 (D[0,`], D[r,1]) for player 2 satisfies,
Mx2 (D[0,`], D[r,1]) =

g2(x), ∀x ∈ [0, `]
g2(`) · r−xr−` + f2(r) · x−`r−` , ∀x ∈ (`, r)
f2(x), ∀x ∈ [r, 1].
C Derivatives of utility functions
Throughout this section we assume Condition G1’ holds. We first provide general formulas
for the first and second partial derivatives of a utility function U(x, y) which is of the form
U(x, y) = F (x,y)y−x .
∂xU(x, y) =
∂xF (x, y)(y − x) + F (x, y)
(y − x)2 , ∂yU(x, y) =
∂yF (x, y)(y − x)− F (x, y)
(y − x)2 (C.1)
∂xxU(x, y) =
∂xxF (x, y)(y − x)2 + 2
[
∂xF (x, y)(y − x) + F (x, y)
]
(y − x)3 (C.2)
∂yyU(x, y) =
∂yyF (x, y)(y − x)2 − 2
[
∂yF (x, y)(y − x)− F (x, y)
]
(y − x)3 (C.3)
∂xyU(x, y) =
∂xyF (x, y)(y − x) + ∂xF (x, y) + ∂yF (x, y)
(y − x)2 − 2
[
∂xF (x, y)(y − x) + F (x, y)
]
(y − x)3
=
∂xyF (x, y)(y − x)− ∂yF (x, y)− ∂xF (x, y)
(y − x)2 + 2
[
∂yF (x, y)(y − x)− F (x, y)
]
(y − x)3
(C.4)
Using equation (2.6) for the utility functions gives the following expressions for their partial
derivatives,
∂xU1(x, y) =
f1(x) + f
′
1(x)(y − x)− g1(y)
(y − x)2 , ∂yU2(x, y) =
g2(x) + f
′
2(y)(y − x)− f2(y)
(y − x)2
∂xxU1(x, y) =
f ′′1 (x)(y − x)2 + 2
[
f1(x) + f
′
1(x)(y − x)− g1(y)
]
(y − x)3
∂yyU2(x, y) =
f ′′2 (y)(y − x)2 + 2
[
f2(y)− f ′2(y)(y − x)− g2(x)
]
(y − x)3
∂xyU1(x, y) =
2
[
g1(y)− f1(x)
]− (f ′1(x) + g′1(y))(y − x)
(y − x)3
∂xyU2(x, y) =
2
[
g2(x)− f2(y)
]
+ (g′2(x) + f ′2(y))(y − x)
(y − x)3
D A verification theorem
Proposition D.1. Under Condition G2 and given r ∈ (a2, 1], (`1, `2) is a solution to Prob-
lem (P) if and only if
V
[r,1]
1 (x) := sup
τ1∈T
Mx1 (τ1, D[r,1]) = M
x
1 (D[`1,`2], D[r,1]), ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. (D.1)
Proof. The arguments are more or less the same as those establishing Theorem 4.5. For the
sake of brevity we therefore only show the proof of necessity (Problem (P) =⇒ (D.1)).
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Define ur on [0, 1] by,
ur(x) = M
x
1 (D[`1,`2], D[r,1])− g1,[r,1](x)
=

(
f1(`
1)− g1,[r,1](`1)
)
x
`1
, x ∈ [0, `1),
f1(x)− g1,[r,1](x), x ∈ [`1, `2),(
f1(`
2)− g1,[r,1](`2)
)
r−x
r−`2 , x ∈ [`2, r),
0, x ∈ [r, 1].
(D.2)
Suppose (`1, `2) is a solution to Problem (P). Similarly to Theorem 4.5, we will prove (D.1)
by showing that ur is the smallest non-negative concave majorant of f1−g1,[r,1] on [0, r]. Initially
we will analyse ur separately on [0, `
1] and [`1, `2]. Observe firstly that the function f1−g1,[r,1] is
nonnegative when evaluated at the points `1 and `2 and hence, by concavity, on [`1, `2]. Recalling
(6.1), this follows from (P), since f1(0) = g1,[r,1](0) and so f1(`
2)− g1,[r,1](`2) ≥ 0. Also
f1(x)− g1,[r,1](x) ≤
(
f1(`
1)− g1,[r,1](`1)
) x
`1
, ∀x ∈ (0, r),
and taking x = `2 shows that f1(`
1) − g1,[r,1](`1) ≥ 0. Therefore ur is a non-negative majorant
of f1 − g1,[r,1] on [0, `1]. This is also true on [`1, r], since f1(r) ≤ g1(r) and so
f1(x)− g1,[r,1](x) ≤
(
f1(`
2)− g1,[r,1](`2)
)( r − x
r − `2
)
, ∀x ∈ [0, r]. (D.3)
Concavity holds for ur on the three intervals [0, `
1], [`1, `2] and [`2, r] separately and, arguing
as in the proof of Theorem 4.5, we can show that ur is continuous and concave on the entire
interval [0, r], completing the proof.
Proposition D.2. Under Condition G2, for every `1, `2 satisfying 0 < `1 ≤ `2 < b, a point
r ∈ [b, 1] satisfies (4.5) with ` = `2 and U2 = Uˆ3 if and only if
V
[`1,`2]
2 (x) := sup
τ2∈T
Mx2 (D[`1,`2], τ2) = M
x
2 (D[`1,`2], D[r,1]), ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. (D.4)
Proof. By Lemma 3.2 it is sufficient merely to consider the optimal stopping problem on the set
[0, `1] ∪ [`2, 1] with obstacle f2 − g2,[`1,`2], and we will only sketch the solution. Note that since
f2 ≤ g2 it is clearly suboptimal to stop in [`1, `2]. From Dynkin’s formula it is also suboptimal to
stop on [0, `1], since f2− g2,[`1,`2] is convex there and f2(x)− g2,[`1,`2](x) ≤ 0 for x ∈ {0, `1}. The
solution is nontrivial only on (`2, 1], where the arguments used for Theorem 4.5 are sufficient to
complete the proof.
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